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Between Perceptions and Threats — The Fraught EU-Russia Relationship 
 
Maxime Larivé
♣ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the 20
th century, the relationship between the European Union and Russia 
has always been extremely complex. The Cold War was considered the highest peak of tension 
ever experienced; but since Vladimir Putin became interim President of Russia on January 1, 
2000, many are readjusting their judgments of instability.  
The period between the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to Putin’s election in 2000 was a 
time of domestic chaos for Russia. These political instabilities were reinforcing the United States’ 
perceptions and its victory over communism. In the 1990s, Russia was experiencing crises 
politically, economically and diplomatically. Meanwhile in 1992, during the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the European Union was created based on a pillar structure, which made it more transparent and 
politically and economically efficient. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU has grown from 12 
to 27 member states. Its market power is becoming extremely attractive and the European sphere 
of influence has increased primarily due to two factors: first, its powerful economy and the 
attraction created by its market, and second, in terms of geography in light of the last two waves 
of enlargement mostly with former soviet states. This enlargement process is a real preoccupation 
for Moscow, which perceives it as a loss of its domination over its former territories.  
  With the accession of Putin to power, Russia has become more powerful economically, 
coherent politically, and it has regained a certain international recognition. Today, the principal 
Russian weapons to reestablish its world power status are its abundant resources of hydrocarbons 
(oil and natural gas). Its main trade partner is the EU. The EU needs Russian hydrocarbons, and 
Russia needs the access to the European market: EU-Russian relations are based on mutual 
dependency.  
  Even while the energy market is a real dilemma, the EU-Russia relationship is ‘special’ due 
to a wide number of issues that they share (political, economical, diplomatic, military and so on), 
and their search for common agreements. In the middle of these tensions, it seems that the major 
issue comes from a lack of communication between both parties. Many questions need to be 
raised, such as: how does the EU perceive Russia and vice-versa? What kind of policies should 
the EU use to promote peace and democracy in Eastern Europe? Is Russia representing any sort 
of threat to the evolution of the EU? 
   In order to answer to these questions, this paper will first identify the perceptions of each 
actor toward the other. Second, the connections between the EU and Russia will be discussed. 
Third, the threats posed to one another will be identified. 
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I. Perceptions of the “Other”: 
 
1.  EU on Russia - Russia on the EU 
 
In order to study the ‘special relationship’ of the EU with Russia, one must start by taking a look 
at their perceptions of one on the other. As Barysch writes, “Russia’s political elite has never 
loved the EU.”  Some Russian politicians even comment that the EU is worse than the Soviet 
Union because of the ‘dicktat of bureaucrats’ (Barysch, 2007b: 1). However, Russian people have 
a positive view of the EU. “If Russian rhetoric sounds angry and intimidating at times, this could 
be because Russian politicians are still smarting from what they see as their country’s humiliating 
weakness in the 1990s” (Barysch, 2007a: 8). The negative perception of the EU stems from the 
Cold War period, when Moscow had a negative view of the European Community, because the 
EC was assimilated as a US/NATO tool of imperialism. Since the end of the Cold War and the 
presidency of Putin, Russia sees the EU primarily as an economic actor, and especially as an open 
market.  
After the Cold War, Russia was living in a period of doubts and trauma. It is only with the 
beginning of Putin’s presidency that Russia is seeking to reestablish its grandeur domestically 
and internationally. For this reason, President Putin often refers to how “Russia was and will 
remain a great power”, and sees Russia as a mighty state (Roberts, 2007: 70). Putin’s 
administration is working on overcoming the trauma inflicted by the ‘loss’ of the Cold War. 
If Russia does not always perceive the EU through a positive lens, one can find some 
reciprocity in Brussels. For example, during the EU-Russia summit in 2007, Russia was criticized 
on a variety of issues, such as Putin’s political regime, the suppressions of political freedoms and 
debate, and its strong centralization of power. The heaviest accusation from the EU was about the 
re-emergence of an authoritarianism regime in Russia (Entin, 2007: 7). Furthermore, European 
member states perceive Russia as an actor that is increasingly using energy as a weapon against 
its neighbors in order to reestablish its sphere of influence and regain international credibility. 
This behavior creates a security dilemma unwelcomed in Brussels (Wiegand, 2007a: 5). But 
Brussels needs to understand that “Russia today is neither the sclerotic superpower of 1987 nor 
the weakened and chaotic state of 1997” (Wiegand, 2007b: 2). The EU views Russia as the most 
challenging task it is facing at the start of 21
st century (Roberts, 2007: 7). Even if Russian 
politicians strongly criticize the EU, the Russian permanent representation at the EU is still the 
largest Russian international diplomatic mission. This representation works with Brussels on the 
creation of road maps in four sectors: economy, exterior security, domestic security, and science 
and education (Entin, 2007: 6). Unfortunately, the results are very limited, and the real issues are 
often not tackled. 
If uncertainty is an important element in the EU-Russia relationship, it is caused by three 
factors: The first is the nature of each actor. The EU is a political hybrid sharing its decision-
makings at a dual level: supranational (pooling of sovereignties) and inter-governmental, whereas 
Russia is working on reinforcing its national sovereignty domestically and internationally with a 
realist perspective.  The second cause is the uncertainty in the behavior of each actor; and the 
third deals with the proximity and interdependence of one another. Therefore, according to Entin, 
in order to improve mutual understanding, the economic links present a primary factor, which, if 
successful, could contribute to increased mutual understanding. (Entin, 2007: 1). 
Thus, both actors diverge in their perceptions of international relations. The EU is seeking to 
reinforce its power through its market, values, norms, and rule of law, which creates a safe 
climate of cooperation. However, Russia is more a traditional state (like the US and China) and 
strongly attached to its sovereignty, and uses Realpolitik as a means, and power as the objective 
(Perret, 2006: 8).
i In order to overcome past traumas, the EU is working on this ‘special 
relationship’ with Russia by involving Russian authorities in global debates. But, according to a 
policy planner in the foreign ministry, “nothing the West is doing to help Russia join the WTO, to   5 
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develop closer cooperation with the EU, to establish equal interaction with NATO, etc … can be 
regarded as a complete and adequate compensation for the lost strategic security that took many 
decades to be created” (Roberts, 2007: 70). Even if perceptions have a strong influence on the 
way the EU and Russia interact, the EU needs to remember that Russia is reorienting its path. 
Because of the weak institutionalization of Russia, bilateral agreements are preferable rather to a 
deeper cooperation between the EU and Russia (Roberts, 2007: 65), in order to first reinforce 
links through bilateral agreements, and then adapt agreements into reality through domestic 
modifications. 
 
2. Domestic modifications: 
Since the end of the Cold War, each actor has been reshaping its government, institutions, and 
domestic policies. These modifications have a direct effect on the way the EU and Russia act 
internationally.  
  In the case of the EU, it all started with the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect on 
January 1, 1993. The Treaty of Maastricht created a union based on a three pillar structure. The 
first pillar is the only pillar having supranational power, where states pool their sovereignty, and 
has mostly to do with the economy of the EU. The second and third pillars are still under 
intergovernmental decision-making. The second pillar deals with the Common and Foreign 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, and the third manages the Justice and Home Affairs. The 
treaty of Maastricht was fundamental for the Union in order to function coherently with a larger 
number of member states. The process of enlargement did not stop with Maastricht. Since then, 
twelve new countries have become members. However, the last waves of enlargement created led 
to uncertainties within the Union. According to Mark Entin, it has progressed too fast, and the EU 
was neither psychologically and nor institutionally ready, which contributed to some European 
policies becoming incoherent and blurry.  
  It has also raised many questions concerning European identity (Entin, 2007: 8). In regard to 
the second pillar, the EU has recently been working on creating a common foreign policy, which 
is based on two aspects: harmonization of legal norms and exportation of democratic peace. The 
harmonization of the CFSP is exemplified with the adoption of the European Security Strategy 
(EES) in December 2003. For the first time in its history, the EU designed a common framework 
for common security issues. The next ESS will be published in spring 2008, and will incorporate 
a section on Russia, which was emphasized less in the 2003 EES issue. The Treaty of Lisbon – 
which was signed on December 13, 2007 by the twenty-seven member states – should contribute 
to creating improved cohesion in European external relations, including its engagements with 
Russia. 
A little further to the east, Russia has seen enormous domestic modifications since Putin has 
taken control of the government. During the 1990s, the domestic situation was chaotic: 
uncontrolled inflation, high level of unemployment, unpaid taxes and so on. As per Mark Entin, 
Putin’s administration has been able to stabilize the economy with a growth of 7%, by controlling 
inflation, making the ruble a stable currency, and paying off exterior debts. Overall, Russia is 
becoming more economically and financially independent. The unemployment rate has decreased 
while salaries have increased. The government was able to reinstitute taxes, allowing for a better 
redistribution of profits (Entin, 2007: 8).  
However, a large gap between the rich and poor still remains in Russia and social mobility 
barely exists. The rate of competition is low, and exterior trade remains unstable, partially 
because the economy is strongly dependent on energy prices (Entin, 2007: 9). In order to institute 
all these measures and reestablish the legitimacy of the government, which was lost under the 
presidency of Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin had two primary intentions: first, the recentralization of 
power domestically, and second, a return to strong state power internationally.  
Unfortunately, the return to a stable economy and government has a cost. In terms of political 
freedom, United Russia, the main political party of Putin, dominates the political stage, as the   6 
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parliamentary election of December 2, 2007 confirmed: United Russia won with 64% of votes, 
which represents two-thirds of the majority in the Duma. Putin destroyed any form of political 
debates, and political opponents were arrested. As per Anders Aslund, “Putin has established a 
purely personal dictatorship. He rules through the presidential administration and competing 
secret police forces without ideology or party” (Aslund, 2007: 1). The second cost is the process 
of re-nationalization of industries, also instituted by Putin. According to Aslund, the private 
sector is losing economic power in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The reporter believes that 
“re-nationalization has not been justified ideologically, but rather cynically: the purpose is simply 
to generate corrupt revenues for top Kremlin officials” (Aslund, 2007: 2).
ii In addition, as Roberts 
explains, Putin concentrates a large level of capital and monopolies in the Kremlin because “he 
sees them as levers of control, the ultimate means of political patronage and instruments of 
foreign policy (Roberts, 2007: 68). 
Lastly, what do Russian citizens prefer? The answer is: a prosperous economy generated by a 
high level of prices of natural gas and oil. According to Charles Grant, “most Russians do not 
worry that the chaotic democracy of the 1990s has been replaced by an authoritarian, Kremlin-
managed political system” (Grant, 2007).
iii 
Even if Russia and the EU do not have the same domestic aspirations, they are sharing one 
similarity: both actors are working on increasing their international legitimacy, starting with a 
domestic restructuring. The European-Russian dilemma starts with the difference in the way each 
seeks legitimacy and power domestically and internationally.  
 
II.  A ‘special relationship’ deeply integrated 
 
1. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: 
After the collapse of the USSR, two partnership agreements between Russia and the EU were 
signed: the first is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) concluded in 1994, and 
which took effect in 1997 for a period of 10 years, with an extension of one year if no further 
agreement. The second is the agreement on the four “common areas”, concluded in 2005. Until 
today, “the legal basis of the EU-Russia relationship remains the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement” (Roberts, 2007: 21). According to a publication of the European Commission, the 
objectives and purposes of the PCA are to promote international peace and security, and to 
support democratic norms for political and economic freedoms (European Commission, 2007: 4). 
The PCA, as designed, should be based on an idea of mutual partnership.
iv 
Therefore, in order to understand why the EU pushed for the PCA, it is necessary to recall 
that European politicians had previously established three principles in order to deal with Russia: 
first, to transform Russia to a market democracy; second, to organize Russian political and 
economic reforms; third, to make Russia committed to ‘common values’ and frameworks of 
western norms (Roberts, 2007: 21). The PCA was agreed on in 1994 when Russia was at its 
weakest and the most vulnerable in its desire to be attached to the West. Nowadays, such 
agreement would not exist, and may be the reason why Russia is not likely to renew the PCA. 
 Through this agreement, European politicians wanted to see the liberalization of Russia. But 
with the opposite evolution of Russia towards becoming extremely centralized, it cannot be 
considered as a complete success of European policies. On the other hand, Russia has been using 
this agreement in order to change European perceptions in regard to Russian politics and to regain 
Russian power. Therefore, one of the problems of this cooperation resides in the lack of 
coordination between European and Russian bureaucracies, in addition to a shortage of qualified 
personnel in the Russian civil service for this type of cooperation. The 1990s were also an intense 
period of transformation for the EU, as it was preoccupied by a series of institutionalized changes 
established by the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
Today, at the end of 2007, the PCA is ending and no further renewal is planned. In order to 
make the relationship mutual, the PCA needs to be rethought. The EU and Russia are working on   7 
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a new agreement that would incorporate the changes that have occurred since 1997. Thus, in the 
90s, “the PCA reflected the EU’s market power and Russia’s relative weakness” (Roberts, 2007: 
21). A decade later, Russian positions have clearly evolved due to the economic implications of 
expanded hydrocarbon production. Now that Russia is reestablishing its power, the relationship 
has to be more balanced. 
 
2.  Energy 
 
The strongest link between the EU and Russia today is probably in hydrocarbons and not the 
PCA. In this beginning of 21
st century, the energy sector is experiencing a period of 
unprecedented growth, allowing Russia to become wealthier and wealthier, especially with the 
recent high price of oil. Many see the EU as energetically dependent on Russia. The other aspect 
however, is Russia’s need to access the European market in order to build its economy. There 
exists a real interdependence between them. This interconnection can be proved by the level of 
imports and exports between the EU and Russia. As highlighted by Gunnar Wiegand, two-thirds 
of EU imports from Russia consist of energy, and two-thirds of Russian total exportation of 
energy goes to the EU. Thus, 44% of European gas import comes from Russia; this number is 
expected to attain 60% in the next year (Wiegand, 2007a: 5). In addition to the hydrocarbons, 
Russia also furnishes 35% of the uranium for EU nuclear energy production. From this 
standpoint, it seems that Russia dominates the EU-Russian relationship, but in fact, Russia 
depends on the European needs for its hydrocarbons, because China is not interested in the 
Russian supply, as it already has contracts with Australia, Indonesia, and other suppliers, such 
Africa. China prefers these as an oil source, as it can establish control over resources in the 
ground there. Furthermore, China is unwilling to pay the high gas prices of the European market 
(Barysch, 2007a: 6). In light of this, Russia does not have many market options, and so far 
European dependency makes Russia more stable, richer and self-confident. 
When Russia cut off the supply of gas to Ukraine, it created panic among EU member states 
because their over-dependency on Russian energy was painfully undeniable. What should the EU 
learn from this event? First, the EU must become more transparent, because as remarked by an 
EU official, “the more Europe frets about energy security, the more tempted Russia will be to 
play this card” (in Barysch, 2007a: 5). Second, the EU needs to rethink its energy policies with 
Russia. Hence, “the West does have the economic and political leverage to force Russia to 
become more transparent and commercial in its foreign energy policies” (Smith, 2006: 4). The 
EU should not let Moscow threaten European member and non-member states, and dictate the 
relationship. Third, the EU needs to deal with a variety of petroleum sources, and diversify its 
energy management in order to limit its dependency on Russia. “The challenge is to ensure a 
continued high level of diversification of supply” (Roberts, 2007: 63).
v  
The fact that the EU has not sufficiently diversified its energy suppliers is remarkable. In 
theory, it would be in the best interest of the EU to cooperate with different suppliers in order to 
negotiate tariffs and not have to worry about energy shortages. However, it seems that the EU 
voluntary decided to depend on Russian hydrocarbons in order to control the development of 
Russia based on western values. One could say that by creating a ‘mutual dependency,’ the EU 
would rather play a non-zero sum game than a zero-sum game. In the short term, a zero-sum 
game, might have been victorious for the EU, but the cost could have been the creation of a 
hostile government right next door to the EU.  
Lastly, the EU is suffering from the fact that Russia is among the most energy inefficient 
countries of the world. For example, Russia is the second largest consumer of gas after the US, 
despite an economy 20 times smaller (Roberts, 2007: 61). The EU should be concerned about this 
fact, which could result in more shortages. 
From a Russian standpoint, Putin is using the ‘energy weapon’ in order to create division 
among European member states, and triess to reinforce Russian domination over former Soviet   8 
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countries. Thus, Putin, who was a former KGB director, purposely let Russian energy policy be 
formulated by former intelligence officers (siloviki) working for his administration.
vi In addition, 
“Putin’s government has also made it clear that it has no intention of ratifying the Energy Charter 
Treaty, a set of rather liberal international rules for trade and investment in the oil and gas sector” 
(Barysch, 2007a: 5). The other reason why Russia refuses to ratify the European charter of energy 
is due to the fact that it would open its energy sector to foreign investments (Perret, 2006: 5). 
Russian authorities are not interested in foreign investments, because Putin has centralized and 
created monopolies over the energy sector. The best example is illustrated by the monopolies of 
two Russian companies over pipelines and the Russian market: Transneft (oil) and Gazprom 
(natural gas). It is only recently that Gazprom decided to change the price of gas from a political 
price to a market price. The Kremlin has consolidated Gazprom’s gas monopoly. By 2008, more 
than half of Russia’s oil production will be under state control. 
The ‘special relationship’ based on hydrocarbons simply shows us that “Europe wants 
security of supply – Russia wants security of demand” (Wiegand, 2007a: 4). The comments made 
by Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia’s former Gazprom chief, Yeltsin’s prime minister, and now 
Russian ambassador to Ukraine, affirmed that “where there are bad political relations, good 
economic [affairs] just don’t happen” (Roberts, 2007: 57). But Russia needs to keep close links 
with the EU, because it represents 60% of Russian exportations of oil and 50% of its gas, which 
correspond to 40% of profits for the Russian state. And 75% of Russian exportation profits come 
from its energy exports (Perret, 2006: 4). In light of these data, Russia is not really in a position to 
threaten or even stop its exports towards the EU. 
 
III. What are the Threats? 
 
Even if Russia and the EU are dependent on the other for their survival, this ‘special relationship’ 
is also mixed with tensions and disagreements. Katinka Barysch clearly distinguishes the current 
troubles facing the EU-Russia relations: 
     angry mobs outside the Estonian embassy in Moscow; Russian energy deals in Central 
Asia that seek to frustrate the EU’s hopes of diversifying its energy supplies; trade 
dispute over meat; concerns over the murders of Vladimir Litvinenko and Anna 
Politkovskaya; Kremlin threats towards the Czech Republic and Poland over missile 
defense; disagreements over Ukraine’s EU aspirations and the ‘frozen’ conflicts in 
Georgia; Russia’s threat to veto UN plans for Kosovo’s independence (Barysch, 2007b: 
1). 
 
In addition to previous concerns, Brussels expresses three worries concerning Russia: first, 
concerns about the respect of democracy and human rights in Russia; second, concerns about the 
harsh tone of Russian foreign policy; and third, Russia’s position on EU enlargement (Wiegand, 
2007a: 1). These concerns from Brussels are central in the way it behaves towards Moscow. 
  
1.   Military divergences: 
 
From a military and security standpoint, Russia and the EU are still divided over current political 
issues. This division starts with the American project to build missile shields in Poland and Czech 
Republic. In case of construction of the missile shields in both host countries, Moscow will 
decide to retarget nuclear missiles onto major European cities. This new West-East confrontation 
has been used strategically by Putin to portray himself as a statesman who does not fear 
confrontation with the West (Slocombe, Thränert, Pikayev, 2007: 14).  
         The EU is experiencing an important period for the future security of its borders. The EU 
has to make a decision: stand up and oppose Washington’s influence on EU territory, or see a 
new threat from Russian missiles targeting its major cities. One might speculate that this situation   9 
  9 
is created by the desire of nation-states to establish a new world order under their supremacy. 
This current dilemma also highlights the weaknesses of the EU, which needs to become more 
independent in term of security and increase its military power. In order to strengthen the voice of 
the EU, European member states must act unanimously when it comes to global security matters. 
The challenge is caused by the fact that the European defense remains under the authority of 
sovereign member states, and decision-making occurs at the inter-governmental level. 
If the EU lacks of a ‘common unified foreign policy,’ Russia poses another challenge. The 
problem of Russia is that Moscow has yet to decide which role it wants to play on the 
international stage. What is certain is that Moscow is seeking to regain its lost world power rank. 
But, the question is “what does Russia stand for, and what are its foreign policy priorities?” 
(Slocombe, Thränert, Pikayev, 2007: 13). This fuzzy foreign policy generates doubts among 
European member states wondering if Russia can be trusted when it comes to security matters. 
That is the question. 
In parallel, recently Russia has been working on the modernization of its strategic nuclear 
forces. Programs of development of new long-range cruise missiles, and of fourth generation of 
nuclear weapons research have been launched (Slocombe, Thränert, Pikayev, 2007: 15).
vii This 
comes at a moment where NATO enlargement is a concern for Russia, which feels insecure 
knowing that NIS are becoming, or are already, NATO members (Slocombe, Thränert, Pikayev, 
2007: 21). However, the EU does not view it from this angle. Brussels believes that it has a strong 
interest in engaging Russia in strengthening stability on the European continent (especially with 
respect to their common borders). The current situation can be summarized by this statement 
made by Cynthia Roberts:  
        The foremost unresolved challenge for European security at the beginning 
of the 21
st century is how best to engage a Russia that is not a member of the 
leading international and Euro-Atlantic institutions composed of market 
democracies, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU), and is lurching back towards authoritarian rule (Roberts, 
2007: 1). 
 
2.  What does Democracy mean? 
 
The aspect of tension discussed in the preceding paragraph is based on the concept of democracy. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU hoped that Russia would adopt democracy. One of 
the solutions to democratize Russia resides in the European contribution to building a strong 
middle class. A conscious middle class would allow for the development of democracy from 
inside Russia (Centre for European Reform, 2007). But, what is happening in Russia is the 
opposite. President Putin is purposely enforcing a strong private sector based on energy, which 
implies a return to totalitarianism. Thus, the use and actions of intelligence officers and police 
have set back Russia’s democratic development (Smith, 2006: 3). 
According to Nicu Popescu, Russian ambition of soft power starts domestically. Russian 
officials have been working on the development of the concept of ‘sovereign democracy,’ which 
should be understood as non-interference from the West (Popescu, 2006: 1).
viii This idea has two 
functions: first, to provide Putin’s authoritarianism some legitimacy, and second, to challenge the 
western concepts of democracy and human rights. (Popescu, 2006: 2). But the dark side of 
Russian ‘soft power’ is that it is created in order to support and legitimize current Russian 
authorities. “It is the new face of ‘smart authoritarianism’ that speaks the language of Western 
norms and is very flexible, but has very little to do with the values of democracy, Eastern- or 
Western- style” (Popescu, 2006: 3). 
Since the election of Vladimir Putin as President in 2000, he has brought stability to Russian 
politics -- but at what cost? Putin organizes the centralization of power in the Kremlin and the 
state, and increase the influence of chekisty (former KGB). But, “the use of supports from 
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military and security services at the expense of private business and civil society raised doubts 
about the credibility of Russia’s commitment to market reforms and property rights, let alone to 
what Putin referred to as ‘managed democracy’” (Roberts, 2007: 37). From Brussels, Putin 
modifications of power and interpretation of democracy is not always welcomed. For example, 
during the Samara Summit in May 2007, German Chancellor Merkel criticized Putin for eroding 
civil liberties domestically. At a different occasion, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France spoke of 
Russia’s democratic weaknesses. According to Barysch, if Germany and France cooperate closely 
on Russia policy, Italy would probably follow the same path toward Russia (Barysch, 2007a: 2). 
In addition, since 2005, the number of EU member states increased considerably and is 
essentially composed of NIS. These states are entering into a period of post-communist transition 
symbolized by their integration process into the EU, i.e. the challenge of the EU to implement 
true democratization in these states and their withdrawal from Russia’s sphere of influence 
(Emerson, 2005: 3). One can say that those states, which have become EU-members are not the 
problem anymore. The issue is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) established by the EU 
in 2004. The objective of the ENP is to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbors. The ENP is the unified institutionalized approach for the EU to 
deal with its Eastern and Southern neighbors. The ENP offers a privileged relationship built on 
mutual commitments such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market 
economy, and so on. However, Russia is not within the sphere of the ENP, and views this 
program negatively, especially for its loss of domination over previous Russian territories. The 
recent events in Georgia (“Rose Revolution”) and Ukraine (“Orange Revolution”) increased the 
level of disagreements and tensions between the EU and Russia. In both cases, Russia is opposed 
to the development of western-style governments. Russian pressure and threats on these countries 
are enormous. Moscow simply uses the energy weapon as a mean of precaution. As previously 
pointed out, during winter 2006 Russia closed down the gas supply to Ukraine. This event had 
huge consequences on the way Germany is today rethinking its energetic policy and interactions 
with Russia 
Beyond the ENP, the EU maintains a regular dialogue with Russia and diverse international 
NGOs on human rights issues. The issues raised are the situation in Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus, freedom of expression and media, situation of civil society in Russia, functionary of 
judiciary, and the problem of racism and xenophobia (European Commission, 2007: 15). 
In 2005, Michael Emerson raised the following question: “when and how may Russia really 
converge on modern European values?” (Emerson, 2005: 3). The answer can be found in the 
Russian parliamentary elections of December 2007. As the elections were organized and resulted, 
many European countries criticize the way elections were controlled, and the absence of political 
debates before the period of elections. Additionally, Russian authorities have been limiting the 
number of NGOs on Russian ground since early 2007, and did not deliver visas for OSCE 
election observers. These events lead to the deduction that Moscow is restraining the access of its 
territory to Western-style institutions and values. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The principal challenge of the ‘special relationship’ between the EU and Russia could be 
summarized with one word: communication. Since the end of the Cold War, the paths of the EU 
and Russia have been extremely different. The EU has grown enormously, and its legitimacy is 
more and more recognized internationally. Foreign countries want to have access to the European 
market. In contrast, Russia is still living a period of reformation and continues to seek a ‘new 
legitimacy.’ The dialogue between both actors was set according to a hierarchical frame 
(dominant-dominated). Now that the Russian economy is stronger and more under control, the 
dialogue is more equal. As a matter of fact, the EU needs to redefine its interaction, dialogue, and 
cooperation with Russia.    11
  11
One of the challenges of the European construction is learning how to interact with exterior 
sovereign states. In the case of Russia, the EU has to interact with a state that does not share the 
same values and norms. Russia possesses a strong economy, but has an authoritarian regime, and 
follows an assertive foreign policy. The EU should not expect to interfere with Russian politics 
and make it change. Today, it would be counter-productive in trying to reach this illusion (Grant, 
2007: 2). 
Many think that “Russia may be seeking a ‘grand bargain’” (Grant, 2007a). But, most of the 
tensions are between Washington and Moscow. This is where the EU can intervene between the 
West and Russia. Europeans have an advantage over Washington due to their strong economic 
ties with Russia. European legitimacy starts with its economic connections. In order to build 
cooperation, the starting point will be first to focus on economic interests rather than values. This 
could be done based on three specific issues: first, trade of energy; second, integration of Russia 
into the global financial system; and third, enforce common interests on a stable “common 
neighborhood.” 
With the intention of limiting tensions, Brussels and Moscow need to come up with common 
solutions. So far, the number of meetings between the EU and Russia is very low, so by 
increasing their numbers, and defining key issues – such as immigration, Kosovo, ENP, 
Chechnya, and so on – the EU and Russia will be able to establish first, a partnership based on 
mutual trust and cooperation, second, cooperate in the solving of international issues, and third, 
enforce stability on the European continent. Then, the EU and Russia need to enforce the quality 
of information brought by the media in order to limit the existence of prejudices and ignorance 
among Europeans and Russians (Entin, 2007: 9). 
The year 2008 will be important in the evolution of this ‘special relationship’ for two reasons: 
first, in March 2008, Russians will vote for their next president. The way the elections will be 
organized and its outcome will be fundamental for the future of EU-Russia relations. Second, 
during the second half of 2008, France will have the presidency of the EU. With its hyperactive 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy, it is very probable that the relationship between the EU and Russia 
will become a central theme in this presidency. Thus, one question can be raised: How will the 
EU position itself towards Russia? 
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ENDNOTES 
 
i Even if the EU and Russia diverge in their understanding of governance and politics, it is fundamental 
to recall that a lot of stereotypes and prejudices are deeply engraved in public opinion and create a 
distortion of the reality. In fact, both civilizations share a large variety of common values such as history 
and culture. 
ii According to Cynthia Roberts, “every year, $2 billion to $3 billion, disappears from Gazprom 
through corruption, nepotism, and simple theft” (Roberts, 2007: 64). The amounts inside a company are 
already high, so at the state level one can assume the proportion might be even higher. 
iii The problem of the public opinion is complex. Western media tend to exaggerate the reality, and 
mainly interview the political opposition. There exists few data on the perception of the government by the 
middle or lower classes. 
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iv “The provisions of the PCA cover a wide range of policy areas including political dialogue; trade in 
goods and services; business and investment; financial and legislative cooperation; science and technology; 
education and training; energy, cooperation in nuclear and space technology; environment, transport; 
culture; and on the prevention of illegal activities” (European Commission, 2007: 4). 
v Cynthia Roberts made an interesting comment based on Churchill’s comments. She wrote: “Europe 
must heed Winston Churchill’s strategy as First Lord of the Admiralty for ensuring oil supplies to the 
Royal Navy after shifting its power source from coal to oil: ‘Safety and certainty in oil,’ he insisted, ‘lie in 
variety and variety alone’.” (Roberts, 2007: 63). 
vi Concerning the influence of the intelligence sector on Putin’s administration, Smith wrote that “the 
actions of the intelligence sector have only set back Russia’s own development as a democracy and as a 
market economy from providing long-term benefits to Russia’s own population” (Smith, 2006: 3). 
vii On December 8, 2007 Russian Rocket Forces spokesman, Aleksandr Vovk, stated that the Russian 
military successfully test-fired a RS-12M Topol ballistic missile (so called SS-25, or Sickle). He added that 
the test involved trying out new, unspecified equipment that Moscow hopes will render Washington's 
missile defense systems useless (Moore, 2007). 
viii “‘Sovereign democracy’ is a term coined by Kremlin ideologist and deputy presidential-
administration head Vladislav Surkov to describe Russia's unique path of democratic development 
(Coalson, 2007b). 
 